After Rosneft acquired TNK-BP, Sechin became almost single-handedly managing a company with a total turnover of $144 billion, which is 2.4 times more than the GDP of Belarus ($60.9 billion) and only $33 billion less than the GDP of Kuwait ($176 billion)

The main helmsman of the Russian fuel and energy complex, Igor Sechin, in just a year and a month of his absence from the government, has greatly increased his political and economic influence. After Rosneft acquired TNK-BP, he began to almost single-handedly manage a company with a total turnover of $144 billion. For comparison: this is 2.4 times more than the GDP of Belarus ($60.9 billion) and only $33 billion less than the GDP of Kuwait ($176 billion). Moreover, unlike the prime minister and other officials, he does not need to ask government permission to manage this money. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former owner of Yukos whose political ambitions landed him in prison, never dreamed of such wealth.

Rosneft plans to include large projects in Russia and abroad: in Italy, Vietnam and South America; in particular, the construction of a Far Eastern oil refinery with a capacity of 30 million tons per year and a cost of up to $45 billion. For the needs of the state-owned company, it is planned to build pipelines alone worth about 577 billion rubles. Rosneft's oil production is already the largest in the world. The head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, said that taking into account the purchase of TNK-BP, the company will produce 210–215 million tons of oil in 2013 according to various standards.

Rosneft's revenue in 2013 could reach $160 billion. Igor Sechin seems to have ensured that all this wealth remains in the hands of the state: the company will not be privatized by 2016, as the liberal wing of the government wanted, but will retain state control over it.

The actual status of the second person in the country turned out to be possible for Mr. Sechin even without official positions in the government of Dmitry Medvedev. From the “gray eminence of the Kremlin” who tried to keep a low profile, Sechin turned into a public figure. Political scientists are seriously considering him as a future successor to GDP along with the current prime minister. The level of his influence on the fuel and energy complex has not fallen at all, and the number of enemies and ill-wishers is growing exponentially. Slon compiled a top list of “Sechin initiatives” and their key opponents.

Fuel and Energy Complex Curator: Sechin vs. Dvorkovich

As soon as Dmitry Medvedev took charge of the government, there was talk on the sidelines about the imminent resignation of Igor Sechin. In the corridors of the Kremlin they whispered that they would not work together “for medical reasons: because they cannot digest each other.” The resignation actually happened, but Igor Ivanovich’s influence in the Kremlin corridors only increased after that.

During the year and month of Igor Sechin’s absence from the post of Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the fuel and energy complex, there were no direct conflicts with the head of government in the political field. But there is an active dive with “Medvedev’s people” - henchmen of the head of government in the Kremlin offices and on the periphery. And the main “opponent” of Igor Ivanovich was the current curator of the “oil industry” in the government, Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich. They have diametrically different views on the development of the industry: Dvorkovich is a supporter of privatization and a liberal approach, and Sechin, in turn, is in favor of consolidating the main assets of the fuel and energy complex in the hands of the state. Having been expelled from the ranks of officials and having taken the post of president of Rosneft, Igor Sechin already in the summer initiated the creation, in defiance of the government, of a presidential commission for the strategic development of the fuel and energy complex and became its executive secretary. Two commissions were supposed to work in parallel: the presidential commission to resolve strategic issues, and the government commission to resolve operational issues. However, in reality, most issues are resolved by the presidential commission. And Arkady Dvorkovich plays the role of a “restraining factor” on the boundless ambitions of Rosneft President Igor Sechin. But so far it has been doing this with varying degrees of success. In particular, Mr. Dvorkovich advocated the systematic privatization of state assets, including energy ones. While Igor Sechin was and remains an opponent of the speedy privatization of state assets of the fuel and energy complex. At the end of May, he said that the government needs to take measures to stimulate production and then put up a stake in Rosneft for sale.

It has now become known that the previous plan for the privatization of state assets until 2016 has undergone changes. According to the Vedomosti newspaper, on June 27 the government plans to consider a new privatization plan for 2014–2016. If, according to the current plan, the state should withdraw from the capital of Rosneft by 2016, now the Federal Property Management Agency wants to retain control in the company and sell only 19.5%. It is proposed to leave the RusHydro and Zarubezhneft companies under state control. According to the current program, a complete exit from their capital was expected by 2016. It is planned to withdraw from the capital of Zarubezhneft gradually - from 100 to 85% by 2016 and to 50.1% by 2020 (instead of selling 100% by 2016). Sale plans until 2016 - 13.7% to Inter RAO and 3% to Transneft - remain.

The current president of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, was against the inclusion of fuel and energy complex assets in the privatization plan. While still deputy prime minister for the fuel and energy sector in 2011, he wrote to Vladimir Putin: Rosneft, having ceased to be state-owned, will not be able to work on the shelf and will pay less taxes. He also added that an objective assessment of Transneft has not been carried out, the privatization of RusHydro could negatively affect its investment projects, and Zarubezhneft is a special purpose company.

Having headed Rosneft, Sechin did not change his attitude towards privatization. At the end of May, he said that the government needs to take measures to stimulate production and then put the company up for sale. As a result, plans changed: apparently, the first person of the state once again listened to the position of Igor Sechin.

Gas King: Sechin vs. Miller

With the acquisition of TNK-BP by Rosneft, great ambitions were born for the state-owned oil company in the gas market: both domestic and foreign. Igor Sechin spoke at the presidential commission on the fuel and energy sector as a lobbyist for the abolition of Gazprom’s monopoly on gas exports, so far only liquefied gas. In this he was supported by the co-owners of Novatek Leonid Mikhelson and trader Gennady Timchenko. As a result, the government has already agreed on a document on the gradual lifting of restrictions on LNG exports; all that remains is to issue a visa to the presidential administration. It is expected that by July the adjusted law “On Gas Export” will come into force, despite protests personally from the head of Gazprom, Alexei Miller. What is being discussed is not the very fact of abolishing the export monopoly, but its order: to allow independent producers only into the markets of Asia and the Pacific, to allow only specific volumes to be exported under separate contracts directly with consumers, or to allow competition with Gazprom throughout the world, including Europe.

With Russia, the situation is even simpler: Rosneft has already taken third place in the country after Gazprom and Novatek in gas production, having produced 13.8 billion cubic meters. m in January – April. And within seven years he expects to “bite off” a fifth of the domestic blue fuel market from Gazprom. According to Igor Sechin, by 2020 the company plans to produce 100 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year. This is 20% of the Russian market volume. (“Gazprom” produced only 479 billion cubic meters of gas in 2012.) This volume is also planned to be achieved through shelf development: Rosneft is already actively competing with Gazprom for offshore fields with large gas reserves. So far, this has turned out to be that the gas monopoly has defended the right to develop seven of the eight disputed areas on the Arctic shelf, but one of them will still have to be developed jointly - within the framework of a joint venture.

Helps the head of Rosneft, Vlad Rusakova, Rosneft vice president for gas business development, to compete with Gazprom and build up “gas muscles.” They say that she “left” Gazprom in 2012 due to disagreements with Alexey Miller. The official reason for the resignation of the former top manager of the gas monopoly is retirement. But Gazprom sources said her criticism of some of the expensive pipeline projects Miller lobbied for played a role. And the head of the gas monopoly could not tolerate this from a member of his predecessor’s team, Rem Vyakhirev. With the arrival of Ms. Rusakova at Rosneft, the topic of the shale revolution, which Gazprom slept through and was supported by Rosneft, came into play. The idea of ​​dividing Gazprom into gas and mining structures in order to increase business efficiency was also resurrected from the ashes.

For reasons of efficiency, gas monopolies may raise the tax burden. Igor Sechin has already cast his bait in this direction. “We will bring almost 3 trillion rubles to the budget, and Gazprom, which is incomparably larger than us, will bring 1.5 trillion,” Prime agency quotes Igor Sechin.

Chinese monopolist: Sechin versus Tokarev

Former comrades in the Kremlin camp of the security forces, the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin and the president of Transneft Nikolai Tokarev, entered into a tough confrontation over the “Chinese contract” of Rosneft. At first, the helmsman of the pipeline monopoly was offended that he was not invited to the Kremlin to discuss the details of an important intergovernmental agreement, which spelled out the key terms of this contract. Still, it’s a serious matter – tripling the volume of supplies of black gold over 25–30 years. The volume of Rosneft oil sent to China will increase at the peak of the contract (from 2018 to 2037) by 31 million tons per year - from the current 15 million tons to 46–49 million tons.

Nikolai Tokarev publicly criticized Mr. Sechin for his company’s refusal to pay 47.2 billion rubles for the expansion of the Skovorodino-Mohe pipeline. And then he even named the volume of Rosneft’s transport “wants” - 300 billion rubles. The position of the head of Transneft regarding the “Chinese pipe” was supported by the government: Deputy Prime Minister for the Fuel and Energy Complex Arkady Dvorkovich and the head of the Ministry of Energy Alexander Novak were on his side. Igor Sechin at first openly resisted the need for such significant expenses: of course, Rosneft borrowed so much from Western banks, traders and China to purchase TNK-BP that now any extra capital project hurts its pocket. It is much better to shift the costs onto the shoulders of all oil companies in the country by uniformly increasing tariffs in all directions!

According to the president of Rosneft, his company’s task is only to pay for transport and make sure “that the tariffs are economically justified.” Later, he agreed with the proposal to pay an increased tariff on the eastern direction of the Transneft pipeline system. But he did it with a caveat. According to him, Rosneft considers Transneft’s stated costs for the construction of new oil pipelines “non-transparent” and will discuss their validity. The company is “ready to set investment tariffs, but reasonable ones.”

Rosneft has an alternative route for the supply of black gold to the Middle Kingdom - through Kazakhstan, where the companies promise cheap entry into the pipeline and significant volumes. However, these are transit risks and complexities of tax legislation, which entails the threat of billions of dollars in revenue losses from export duties for the Russian budget and Transneft’s income from idle export capacities.

As we see, the dispute in the Kremlin corridors between the heads of two state-owned companies is not over yet. Vladimir Putin chose to give a lengthy instruction to “find funds for the construction of the pipeline outside the country’s budget,” suggesting that they look at the treasury of the Far East Development Fund. In public, both debaters have calmed down for now, but they continue to fight in the corridors. A compromise scenario is quite likely: the tariff for Rosneft in the east could be raised for 2-3 years, and then quietly distributed evenly throughout the entire pipeline, explaining it as planned pipe repairs or other occasions.

Oil seller: Sechin vs. Timchenko

With the arrival of Igor Sechin as president of Rosneft, the state company promptly replaced the main trader for the sale of its oil. At the end of last year, Rosneft entered into a five-year contract for the supply of 67 million tons of oil with Vitol and Glencore. The total contract amount, according to market estimates, was about $50 billion, the prepayment was $10 billion (this is the amount of the loan that Vitol and Glencore jointly raised to finance the deal). Gunvor, owned by Vladimir Putin’s friend Gennady Timchenko, began to rapidly lose Rosneft trader tenders for the purchase of oil, but continued to purchase oil products. According to sources familiar with the terms of Rosneft’s deal with traders, the decision to involve Mr. Timchenko’s competitors was due to their connections in banking circles and the ability to finance the deal to purchase TNK-BP. In addition, they say that the purchase prices for Vitol and Glencore turned out to be higher than for Gunvor (the participants do not disclose the price of such contracts on the basis of commercial secrets).

Later, Mr. Timchenko, in an interview with the Swiss newspaper Neue Zurcher Zeitung, said that Rosneft’s oil was too expensive for him, and suggested that competitors had agreed to buy raw materials at inflated prices “in the hope of getting other business with Rosneft, for example, to develop general mining projects." Prior to this, negotiations on participation in Rosneft’s geological exploration projects were conducted by Timchenko’s own structures. But so far there is no news about the entry of Swiss traders into the production projects of the largest oil company.

Market participants believe that the main reason for changing traders is financial. They say that the “excommunication” of Vladimir Putin’s friend Gennady Timchenko from the traders of the largest oil company became possible with the tacit approval of the head of state and precisely for economic reasons: nothing personal. The relationship between Mr. Timchenko and the “real Igor Ivanovich” (as Sechin was nicknamed in the government, and Igor Shuvalov was dubbed the “fake”) has not been completely broken. They just changed their direction. Gunvor and Rosneft signed an agreement to export fuel oil with a volume of 6 million tons and a value of up to $4 billion. They were seen together at a hockey match. And already this year they presented a united front against the head of Gazprom in the fight for the admission of independent producers to the export of liquefied gas. However, they act as a united front only if they pursue common business interests; they cannot be called friends.

Total controller: Sechin against the Rotenbergs

For the first time in five years, the Accounts Chamber carried out a comprehensive audit of Gazprom, promising to pay especially close attention to the pipeline contracts of the gas monopoly with the structures of the Northern European Pipeline Project (SETP) of the Rotenberg brothers.

SETP provides about 70% of the supplies of large-diameter pipes (LDP) it needs to Gazprom. In April last year, according to Gazeta.ru, SETP won a tender for the supply of 487.5 thousand tons of large-diameter pipes (the total volume of Gazprom’s order is 780 thousand tons), offering 42.862 billion rubles, which was 0.4 % (180 million rubles) below the starting price.

The idea of ​​inspections was suggested to the head of state by Igor Sechin, many market participants say. It was at his instigation that the mass “recruiting” of officials of all stripes allegedly began: from State Duma deputies to top managers of state-owned companies. With a ban on having foreign accounts and the need to declare real estate and other types of property outside Russia. Previously, SETP regarding pipe contracts was inspected by antimonopoly officers from the FAS, who came to the company to check and seize documents. The actions of the antimonopoly officials bore fruit: for the first time in the last six years, it was not the intermediaries who won the Gazprom tender for the supply of pipes, but the pipe manufacturers themselves, concluding contracts worth almost 10 billion rubles.

The initial purpose of the inspection could have been to weaken Mr. Miller’s influence at Gazprom. If facts of excess costs and even corruption are revealed during this audit, more than one executive head in the gas monopoly may fly and contracts with its traders (not only SETP) may be revised. Is it a coincidence that the statements about the audit of Gazprom by the Accounts Chamber and the scandalous program of the television tribune Mikhail Leontiev, where he called Alexei Miller crazy and announced that he slept through the “shale revolution”, approximately coincided in time.

Igor Sechin himself does not yet have to be afraid of inspections: Sergei Stepashin’s subordinates plan to inspect Rosneft, which he controls, only next year. Moreover, unlike other officials and top managers, all sorts of accusations are made against him, but not of corruption. Time will tell what Igor Sechin’s struggle on many fronts at once will lead to.

As is known, the head of state prefers to divide the elites, not allowing any of the Kremlin figures to gain influence. O better than the boss himself. And the main criterion for “closeness to the body,” as in Italian clans, is absolute loyalty and devotion to the first person, which Igor Sechin has so far successfully proven. In this regard, the option of the “Yeltsin scenario” of transfer of power cannot be ruled out, when the family of the ex-president of Russia received guarantees of immunity, and the successor was gradually able to acquire full power in the country over several years. One thing is clear: the option of a “puppet successor” in the case of choosing the figure of Igor Sechin is a priori an illusion.

Lyudmila Podobedova

https://www.site/2015-01-28/sechin_pod_udarom_rotenbergi_oslabli_shoygu_nastroen_protiv_chemezova

Conflicts around Putin have escalated

Sechin is under attack, the Rotenbergs have weakened, Shoigu is opposed to Chemezov

This year will bring an exacerbation of intra-elite conflicts between state corporations and the government, in the oil and defense industries, and the banking sector. There will be a major regrouping of the elites, according to sources and experts at Znak.com.

A few months ago, in the “Politburo 2.0” report, describing the relationship between the Russian elites among themselves and with President Vladimir Putin, the Minchenko Consulting company made a forecast that in 2015, in the context of a serious economic crisis, the struggle of clans will noticeably intensify: resources are becoming less and less, state support Not everyone will get it, you will have to fight for a place at the feeding trough.

Already now, looking at who received money on demand, and who was promised it, but has not yet been given it (or who was given it, but not as much as others), we can make a number of assumptions about the development of several intra-elite well-known in political circles conflicts.

A few days ago, the state Deposit Insurance Agency published a list of banks that may qualify for state support. Of the state-owned banks, VTB Group, Gazprombank, and Rosselkhozbank are vying for help, two government sources told RBC. The DIA will allocate more than 300 billion rubles to the banks of the VTB group: VTB – 193 billion rubles, its retail subsidiary VTB24 – 65.8 billion rubles, Bank of Moscow – 49 billion rubles. Gazprombank will be given 125 billion rubles, Rosselkhozbank - 69 billion rubles.

The Chairman of the Board of VTB Bank is Andrey Kostin, among its shareholders are the Russian government, billionaire Suleiman Kerimov, Geberali funds, TPG Capital, the Norwegian Norges Bank, the State Bank of Azerbaijan, as well as Chiba Construction Bank. Gazmprombank's shareholders are Gazprom, Vnesheconombank, Sergei Rosenberg, Tinkoff, RDK, as well as the bank's management. Chairman of the Board of Directors – Chairman of the Board of OJSC Gazprom Alexey Miller. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Moscow is the same Andrey Kostin, its main shareholder is the VTB Group.

If you turn to the Politburo report and study the slide “Orbits of Power”, it turns out that Kostin, together with the head of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, the head of Sberbank German Gref, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and presidential assistant Alexander Belousov in one sector and in the orbit of influence of Yuri and Mikhail Kovalchukov, and Alexey Miller - in the orbit of influence of Gennady Timchenko, the same Kovalchuks and the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin.

Among private banks, state support can be received by Alfa Bank - 62.8 billion rubles, banks of the Otkritie group - 65 billion rubles, Promsvyazbank - 30 billion rubles, Moscow Credit Bank - 20 billion rubles, Rossiya Bank - 13 billion rubles, Uralsib Bank – 12 billion rubles, MDM Bank – 9 billion rubles. The parent company of Alfa Bank is a company in Cyprus. Indirectly, the controlling stake is controlled by Mikhail Fridman, German Khan, and Alexey Kuzmichev. Millionaire Alexander Mamut, vice-president of LUKOIL Leonid Fedun, millionaires Vadim Belyaev, Ruben Aganbegyan, Alexander Nesis, Sergey Gordeev and others are related to the banks of the Otkritie group. The chairman of the board of directors of Promsvyazbank is ex-senator Alexey Ananyev, his brother Dmitry is still with the Federation Council. The main owner of MKB is Roman Avdeev, Uralsib Bank is Nikolay Tsvetkov, MDM Bank is various financial structures, including offshore ones.

Fridman also belongs to Kovalchuk’s orbit of influence, Mamut is considered a fairly close person to the first deputy head of the presidential administration Vyacheslav Volodin, Fridman is considered to be close to presidential assistant Vladislav Surkov, and it is also believed that Friedman has a cool relationship with Sechin after Rosneft bought TNK-BP (Fridman then headed the board of directors of TNK-BP, but left his post after the completion of the transaction, with which he did not agree).

Moreover, the banking sector is of priority importance for another structure: according to unofficial data, the FSB has a great interest in this market.

It is noteworthy that Yuri Kovalchuk’s Rossiya Bank has so far received relatively little government support, which has given rise to whispers about reducing the influence of this businessman, who was among the first to be sanctioned.

The bank of the brothers Arkady and Boris Rotenberg (SMP-Bank) has not yet received state support, which was also noted by the publication’s interlocutors on the sidelines. But the large amount of state support from Otkritie Group of Companies has caused many jokes that the owners of the banks included in the group have fallen into favor, while there is a hypothesis that the group’s banks enjoy the patronage of the Central Bank.

Professor at the Higher School of Economics Konstantin Sonin notes that in the near future, conflicts in the banking sector can only worsen. “In the banking sector, money flows more freely than in state corporations, especially since payment for allocated funds is not as public as for funds from the National Welfare Fund. The main place of struggle now will be the banking sector, not the industrial sector,” says Sonin.

The same opinion is shared by the former Deputy Prime Minister of the government, now co-chairman of the RPR-PARNAS party Boris Nemtsov. “The main priority in a crisis, as I see it, will be to help banks. Here, not so much economic considerations as “conceptual” ones will play a role, and the government’s position will not matter here. At the level of the Ozero cooperative, it makes sense to communicate with President Putin, and not with the government,” Nemtsov believes.

Thus, Rosneft has encountered difficulties with direct state support; this may be due to an old conflict between the head of the company, Igor Sechin, and the current government led by Dmitry Medvedev.

“At the end of 2014, Rosneft asked for funds from the National Welfare Fund, and its request, according to observers, exceeded 2 trillion rubles. After the company did not receive these funds, its request is already estimated at 1 trillion, says Ilya Alkov, editor of the markets department of Oil & Gas Journal Russia. “However, the other day information appeared again that the government does not authorize the provision of this money. The story does not appear to be over, and the oil and gas giant will still make attempts to obtain help. Let’s not forget that just yesterday the state corporation carried out another large bond issue and raised serious ruble funds. It is clear that Rosneft today has concentrated the lion's share of Russian oil production, large loans have been taken out for the development of fields, and they need to be serviced, tax payments need to be ensured (including from the export of raw materials), and the corporation also needs to carry out large projects, in particular in the field of modernization oil refineries. Some investment programs may be sequestered, but many will be continued, since they are carried out under the auspices of raising gasoline quality standards, stability of its supply, avoiding gasoline crises and jumping fuel prices. But the fate of such a project as the construction of the Eastern Petrochemical Company (VNHK) in the context of a worsening crisis is clearly under threat. In any case, the discussion between Rosneft and the government in the field of financial support will continue,” says Ilya Alkov.

A site source close to the presidential administration says that in the last month the government has complained to the Kremlin about Rosneft’s behavior on the foreign exchange market in December 2014, which could have triggered the collapse of the ruble. A government report about this was even written to the Kremlin, the source says.

“This story is reminiscent of the story of Sergei Chemezov before the 2008 crisis, when he was one of the most influential people around Vladimir Putin. However, it later turned out that the state corporation Rostekhnologii, which he headed, had acquired problematic assets. Now his star has dimmed a little. The same thing is happening with Sechin: Rosneft turned out to be the main target in the problematic situation that arose in connection with the crisis. It has large corporate debts that need to be paid off quickly; Rosneft is the largest requester for money from the state and government. Sechin is now in a dependent position on the financial and economic bloc of the government, and the government can repay him. Rosneft has not yet been given money, it is being bullied, the state company is in a difficult situation, although for their sake the issue has already been allowed. Now the government will give industry-specific opinions on all Rosneft projects and, I think, will join the campaign against Sechin..

In the defense industry, things are also complicated. On this field there are two of the most influential players today - Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the head of the Russian Technologies State Corporation Sergei Chemezov, as well as a weaker player - Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin. The influential head of the UVZ holding, Oleg Sienko, according to the Politburo 2.0 report, is also included in Shoigu’s orbit of influence (however, he also has a lot of contacts with Rogozin).

The publication’s interlocutors close to the government describe the relationship between “Sergei” and “Dmitry” as “very complex” now.

In particular, according to information from two interlocutors, Shoigu made proposals for restructuring the Russian Technologies State Corporation (headed by Sergei Chemezov) in order to demonopolize the industry, but so far the idea has not been crowned with success. Having actually lost foreign markets, the Russian Technologies State Corporation found itself completely dependent on the state and the same Ministry of Defense.

Dmitry Rogozin continues to claim the informal position of “chief political deputy prime minister” and constantly speaks out in support of the domestic defense industry, Donbass militias, and so on. However, as sources note, the importance of this person should not be compared with such titans as Shoigu and Chemezov, who are likely to find a common language in a crisis situation.

As a result, the situation is as follows: Russian Technologies will not be reformatted, but the issue of means of supporting military-industrial complex enterprises has not yet been resolved. A proposal was received from the State Duma from deputy Vladimir Gutenev to allocate 4 trillion rubles to them, but so far no final decision has been made.

The publication's interlocutors advise paying attention to who exactly will be the main person responsible for the distribution of state support, and note that on this basis a conflict may arise along the Shoigu-Rogozin line, in which Shoigu will most likely win.

The source notes that due to the crisis, the government of Dmitry Medvedev, which began to be seen off from the very first day, has temporarily stabilized, however, all intra-elite conflicts will continue to develop during the current year.

The head of the Center for Political Technologies, Igor Bunin, notes that in the elites everyone has to fight for access to the first person, that is, to disappearing resources, but even this may not be enough now.

“Previously, proximity to the first person gave carte blanche, but now we see that this carte blanche can be blocked. You have to stand in line for government support, you can win a few places in it, but you can’t bypass them all. The argument becomes the danger of a social explosion as a result of the cessation of the work of an organization - for example, the same Rosneft. That is, closeness to the first person became less significant than the presence of a potential major social conflict. As for the government, it is doomed to the slaughter. Maybe in three months, maybe in six months, maybe in a year. But for now, it is it that distributes the money and can say that this enterprise is entitled to state support, but not another,” notes Bunin.

“There are two differently directed processes in the elites,” says political scientist Olga Kryshtanovskaya. – On the one hand, this is centripetal consolidation, when people understand that there is an external enemy and see a leader whose team they want to be on; and the stronger the enemy’s onslaught, the stronger the unity. But there is a second aspect: state aid, which must be divided, and here internal competition begins to play a big role, which will intensify,” says Kryshtanovskaya.

The author of the report “Politburo 2.0”, head of the International Institute of Political Expertise, Evgeniy Minchenko, believes that the strengthening of the government should not be overestimated: it performs the function of an accountant issuing money.

“I do not agree with the point of view that state corporations have weakened and the government has strengthened. On the contrary, it is under serious pressure, and it is unknown how long it will work: at least until the end of Putin’s presidential term, or at least resign early. In my opinion, the most interesting thing is happening around the financial “triangle”: Gref (head of Sberbank), Nabiullina (head of the Central Bank), Kostin (head of VTB). The first attack on the Central Bank's policies was repulsed when Putin said that he trusted the policies of his leadership. But there is a question about how much trust in them will be enough,” Minchenko believes.

“The presidential campaign is anti-elitist in nature - “the president together with the people against the snickering bureaucrats.” How is Putin's inner circle changing and who could become the new prime minister?

Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign, which began in June 2017, has a pronounced anti-elitist character: “the president, together with the people, against snickering bureaucrats,” says the report “Politburo 2.0” prepared by the Minchenko Consulting holding. The “Politburo” refers to the president’s inner circle, the informal network structure of the ruling elite.

The issues of intrigue of the presidential campaign and the formalization of its predictable result are of little importance for Putin, says the author of the report, Evgeny Minchenko. Competition between participants occurs for resources. According to the compilers of the Politburo, three people may fall out of the eight Politburo members closest to the president - in addition to the former head of the Kremlin administration Sergei Ivanov and billionaire Gennady Timchenko, who left the circle last year.

Vladimir Putin has taken a course towards reducing the role of Politburo 2.0 participants, relying on new nominees who owe their rise to the president personally. Clienteles of Politburo 2.0 members and candidates, their children, mid-level bureaucrats, and even Putin’s secretariat and bodyguards were used as a personnel reserve.

Politician Alexei Navalny, who announced his presidential nomination, can hardly count on victory: the outcome of the 2018 elections is practically predetermined by the victory of Vladimir Putin, the authors of the report believe.

Dmitry Medvedev

Dmitry Medvedev, as a member of Politburo 2.0 and a participant in the next ruling elite coalition, has the greatest stability, Minchenko Consulting believes. Navalny, with his investigation “He’s not your Dimon,” knocked the prime minister out of the list of potential participants in the presidential race, but at this point he exhausted his functionality. Medvedev's advantages include confirmation of super-loyalty to Putin and experience in two key positions. But at the same time, other members of Politburo 2.0 are against the idea of ​​​​recreating the tandem, and besides, Medvedev has image problems. After the elections, he can retain the post of prime minister, move to Gazprom and deprive Igor Sechin of the position of “chief energy engineer,” or move to the Supreme Court and become an informal civilian curator of the law enforcement bloc.

Sergei Shoigu

The head of the Russian Ministry of Defense maintains the image of the most successful minister and has a chance of becoming the head of a super-ministry. But at the same time, it carries the risk of force majeure at points of military operations and may suffer from new unilateral actions by the administration of US President Donald Trump in the Middle East.

Sergey Chemezov

The CEO of the Rostec state corporation is increasing his influence. Among its strengths, the authors of the report note effective personnel lobbying, as well as the expansion and takeover of enterprises in the military-industrial complex (for example, Rostec gained control over Uralvagonzavod). However, these advantages have a downside: excessive strengthening, questionable efficiency of many enterprises and failures in the implementation of significant projects.

Yuri Kovalchuk

The authors of the report call the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rossiya Bank an adept in the formation of a new economy. He retains informal influence over Putin, has significant financial and media resources, and also has the ability to become the center of a new coalition of elites. At the same time, after the cooling of relations with the West, Kovalchuk does not have stable contact with Western technology centers. The second drawback is a weak public image.

Sergei Sobyanin

The mayor of Moscow has a long-term management initiative - Moscow renovation. This is a financially intensive project that ensures the participation of other elite groups in it, becoming Sobyanin’s allies, notes the BBC Russian Service. He does not express personal ambitions and shows deep involvement in his immediate responsibilities, which makes him the second contender for the post of prime minister after Medvedev. But the mayor of Moscow also has a drawback that is significant for this position - he feels uncomfortable during public political speeches.

Losing influence

Igor Sechin

The Rosneft chief executive, considered one of Putin's most loyal members of his team, has increased risks. “Sechin’s assertive management style is forming a broad elite coalition against him,” Minchenko notes. The growing expansion of Rosneft, gaining control over Bashneft, the arrest of Economic Development Minister Alexey Ulyukaev and the scandalous dispute with AFK Sistema are causing protest from many members of the ruling class and business representatives. In addition, in recent years, Sechin has lost a number of allies in the security forces, and therefore he may take the path of creating a coalition, which he was not previously inclined to do.

The people who compiled the report on the risk of weakening the positions of Igor Sechin, as well as Vyacheslav Volodin and Arkady Rotenberg, show signs of “serious political disorder,” Rosneft press secretary Mikhail Leontyev told RBC. “It’s delusions of grandeur to put people in places: I’ll cross this one out, and I’ll promote this one, and I’ll demote this one,” he said.

Vyacheslav Volodin

The Chairman of the State Duma has the background of a professional public politician and retains informal influence on leading political parties and the ONF. But he cannot radically improve the status of the lower house of parliament in the current political conditions. In addition, there is a risk of conflict between him and the government apparatus.

Arkady Rotenberg

A member of the board of directors of SMP Bank is the “king of infrastructure projects” - for example, his company Mostotrest received the largest government contract for 228 billion rubles. for the construction of a bridge to Crimea. At the same time, he has no serious failures. Rotenberg has long been a communicator with foreign economic elites, but after being included in the sanctions lists and the cooling of relations with the West, his group is having difficulty setting goals, the report says.

The first session of the VTB Capital investment forum “Russia Calling!” that opened on October 13 with the participation of the heads of all key financial and economic departments of the country was called “Ensuring macroeconomic stability, creating conditions for economic development.” And it turned out to be almost entirely devoted to the participants’ disputes about the oil sector. Perhaps the presence of the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, a speaker at investment forums infrequently, ultimately determined the main content of the discussion. Or perhaps, on the contrary, ensuring macro-sustainability and development is now determined mainly by the oil sector. Minister of Economic Development Alexey Ulyukaev began with this, calling on his colleagues to help the oil sector: “Who is the main producer of value in our country? Neftyanka. What should be done? We need to help the oil business invest.”

“We have recently only helped the oil industry. If benefits were given, they were mainly to the oil business. To the disadvantaged - in quotes, of course,” noted Finance Minister Anton Siluanov. This concentration of assistance was a tactical mistake, he believes: the more you help the oil industry by giving benefits, the fewer resources will be left for other sectors.

Sechin prefaced his answer by notifying those present about the instructions of the forum organizers: “I must revive the discussion. I’ll try to do it,” and the audience immediately perked up, applauding. There are several economic models, Sechin looked at the notes: the Ministry of Finance’s model boils down to the annual budget and the legend of devaluation income in export industries, there is also the Central Bank model, the proposals of the Ministry of Economic Development - they are the most realistic, Sechin approved, there are models of independent experts. “There are many models, there is no growth,” he concluded. Even worse, the virtual accrual of devaluation income leads to the withdrawal of investment resources from system-forming sectors of the economy, he pointed out to Siluanov: “This situation was once described in Ecclesiastes, where on a similar occasion it is said: what is crooked cannot become straight, and what is not, cannot be counted." The Ministry of Finance proposed to withdraw 600 billion rubles from oil workers who received additional profits due to devaluation. into the 2016 budget, but in the end only 200 billion were withdrawn.

Reduction of withdrawals to 200 billion rubles. led to an increase in the oil production forecast by 5 million tons, Ulyukaev supported Sechin: “I am sometimes surprised at the logic of my friend Anton [Siluanov],” he said. “Do we want budget revenues only this year or next year too?” Ulyukaev called for finding a balance between the interests of business and the budget: “And I, Anton, guarantee that we will then be able to increase federal budget revenues from the oil industry from year to year.”

"Economics is a person"

“Indeed, Igor Ivanovich revived the discussion,” Siluanov assessed “too narrow an understanding of the Ministry of Finance’s model.” The Ministry of Finance’s task is to leave more funds to companies, withdrawing less from the budget, he repeated. And if there were no “devaluation withdrawals,” then we would have to increase the budget deficit, that is, borrow more and withdraw resources from private businesses, and raise rates, he explained. Banks are always ready to help the Ministry of Finance with borrowings, the head immediately assured VTB Andrei Kostin, as if confirming Siluanov’s fears: “We are always there.” And he turned to the president of Rusal, Oleg Deripaska, to whom the moderator gave the floor: “Please, like Igor Ivanovich, also revive the discussion.” “No, we can’t take that risk,” Deripaska sighed.

But there are a few comments, Deripaska admitted: “I’m not sure that investments are needed now. It seems to me that we need to understand economic policy in general. I feel that in the coming year it is unlikely that we will come to anything definite. This is also good: someone was led through the desert for 30 years.” When dollar GDP tends to the level of 1998, it is better not to count on investments, and no one will borrow at 12% in foreign currency either. “Resources are very expensive. The financial system is usurious. I’m sorry, it came out,” he looked at the forum owners. “Please, please,” the session moderator, first deputy chairman, encouraged Deripaska VTB Yuri Soloviev. Economic policy should be to support demand, Deripaska concluded: it is necessary to support not only large companies, but also their consumers - small and medium-sized businesses.

The general director and main owner of Magnit, Sergei Galitsky, put it even more clearly: “Growth [of the economy] depends on needs, and the unit of consumption in the economy is the person.” Increasing life expectancy will lead to increased demand, but almost no one is investing in this, he pointed out: for example, pension money could have been used for infrastructure, reducing deaths on the roads, but it was not used that way. “I would pay attention to how we treat human life,” he advised. “Human life in the 21st century is the main resource.”

Galitsky’s speech was very pleasing, Central Bank Chairman Elvira Nabiullina admitted: “Otherwise, we began to get the impression that our whole model is about how much taxes to take from the oil sector.” It became clear who exactly managed to revive the discussion.

Good for Deripaska

Nabiullina agreed with Deripaska that demand is primary, but disagreed that growth at high rates is impossible: “Possible.” The share of credit resources in investments is 10-20%, the main source is company funds; in the first half of the year, company profits increased by 40%, but they did not invest it, she stated. In order for capital to flow into those niches where there is demand, we need fair competition, a reduction in administrative barriers and a whole set of measures, “which are even boring to talk about,” Nabiullina sighed: but without creating a good business climate, there will be no economic growth, no matter how much you want simple decisions, she concluded, are the key issue of economic policy. Deripaska agreed that there are things worse than enslaving lending conditions: “What is happening now in the judicial system is out of the question, this is the greatest risk for doing business - even greater than high interest rates.”

The state cannot invest, but private business does not want to, the moderator paraphrased another quote, summarizing the speeches of businessmen.

The Central Bank will support the economy by reducing inflation, Nabiullina assured: “So that investors make meaningful, calculated decisions in predictable conditions.” Is it worth counting on pension money, the moderator asked Siluanov about predictability. “It’s certainly worth calculating,” the minister replied. “I hope 2016 is the last time we accept a moratorium.”

The owner of the forum, Kostin, who took the floor, also tried to revive the discussion, saying that there is no crisis, and anyone who thinks otherwise is either young and does not remember 1998, or has a short memory: “We do not feel like we are in a crisis.” There are just a lot of banks - 774, although 200 of them contain 97% of the assets of the banking sector - the rest clog it up, Kostin was indignant: “The banking business is not like baking bread for you!” Banks also have no problems with lending - if there was a need, he said. “But if today small and medium-sized businesses are not in demand in the country, if there is no field of activity for them, what is the point of lending, these will only be bad debts,” he objected to Deripaska.

Nabiullina objected to Kostin that small banks have their own niche, and the Central Bank has no goal of reducing their number - only unscrupulous players. “For the mother of the banking community, every child is equally loved,” Kostin was touched. “Well, yes, and we are the stepdaughters of the banking community,” Deripaska remarked gloomily. Of course, there is a crisis, he objected to Kostin: sanctions have greatly distorted conditions, access to capital markets has almost disappeared. “Oleg Vladimirovich is my friend and a very good long-time client, but depriving him of access to the capital market is good for him, because no matter how much money you give him, he will use it all somewhere,” Kostin scolded the client.

Peak of the crisis

The second session was devoted to communication between President Vladimir Putin and investors. He did not give a speech, but answered questions for more than an hour and a half. Kostin took the presenter’s place and reported to the president the outcome of the previous discussion: “In general, it was agreed that the situation in the country is under control, the policy is clear.”

After the best economists, financiers and bankers had spoken, it was unlikely that anything substantive could be added, Putin said: “The whole point of my presence comes down to saying that I support them.” The President praised the government and the Central Bank for their “high level of responsibility, consistency and ability to achieve results.” This is also a good prerequisite for investing in Russia, Putin concluded and recalled that in the third quarter Russia received a net inflow of capital for the first time since the second quarter of 2010: “I think my colleagues have already said.” But the best economists, financiers and bankers somehow forgot to mention this fact - either because of disputes about the oil industry, or simply because the influx was not exactly capital: it was formed mainly due to the reduction of foreign assets of Russian companies and banks that sold them to pay off debt due to the difficulties of refinancing it.

The peak of the crisis in the economy, if not yet passed, has already been reached, Putin said, the situation has stabilized, the economy is adapting to new conditions. Modest forecasts for oil prices are about $50/barrel. - make it possible to concentrate on the main task, which in such conditions is even easier to solve than with expensive oil, Putin said: “And this task is structural changes in our economy.”

When asked by the President of Siemens in Russia about the prospects for participation in the construction of high-speed traffic, Putin assured that he highly values ​​German business, which “does not shy away from side to side due to the political situation,” but if Russia’s access to European funding is limited, then the best prospects for participation are - from China. Representatives of South Africa, on the contrary, were concerned that China was actively investing in Africa, but Russia was not. There is no need to be afraid of any investments, Putin reassured.

US investors were interested in whether Russia could limit the freedom of movement of capital and how the next moratorium on pension savings would be combined with a consistent and long-term economic policy. The fact that savings have been frozen for several years now speaks volumes about the consistency of the policy, Putin joked. This is due to the lack of funds in the pension system, he explained, promising that the funded system will develop in the future. No steps are planned to restrict the movement of capital, Putin assured. A Russian investor complained to Kostin that he did not want to lend to small businesses. “Don’t overdo it!” - Kostin got angry. “Jerk it, distort it,” Putin allowed.

When asked to comment on US President Barack Obama’s statement that Russia was losing leadership in Syria, Putin said that he was not going to discuss this: “There can only be one leader in Syria – the Syrian people.” Russia acts in strict accordance with the UN Charter, in contrast to its “colleagues led by the United States,” who act without a UN Security Council resolution and without the invitation of the Syrian authorities, he emphasized. And besides, they are acting unsuccessfully, Putin continued: “Now they have reported that aircraft are delivering ammunition and ammunition to the free Syrian army - where is this free Syrian army? If they drop something from the air, won’t it all fall into the hands of ISIS again? Where are the guarantees, because this just happened!” They say that our pilots are striking the wrong targets, not ISIS, he continued: “We informed the US leadership in advance - the US has never done this, but this is the first time we have done this out of respect and a desire to establish working contacts. Now they tell us: a) we are not ready to cooperate with you and b) you are striking at the wrong targets. We asked: give us those goals that you consider 100% terrorist. No, we are not ready for this, was the answer. We thought and asked one more question: then tell us where not to hit. No answer either!” - Putin was indignant.

“The economic discussion continues,” Kostin tried to urge investors to stick to the topic of the forum, but the next question was also about Syria and ISIS. “Maybe we can go back to pensions after all?” – Kostin suggested almost hopelessly to the audience, but the next question was about dialogue with Turkey on Syria. When asked about the sustainability of the truce with Ukraine, Putin replied that the implementation of the Minsk agreements does not depend on Russia, but on the United States, Europe and Kyiv, but it is easier for them to shift all problems to Moscow. Putin, unlike the presenter, was not embarrassed by questions about politics; he answered willingly and twice extended the time for the “last three questions.” And only the very last of them finally turned out to be about the oil industry and the advisability of supporting it. Putin reconciled the positions of Ulyukaev and Siluanov: while striving to diversify the economy, there is no need to suppress an effectively operating industry, he concluded.

The editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper received a call on his mobile phone. “This is a switchboard. Vladimir Vladimirovich will speak to you.” - "Who?" - "Vladimir Vladimirovich". - “Give me your last name, please.” - "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin". It wasn't a prank. But at the other end of the line it was not Vladimir Vladimirovich, but Igor Ivanovich Sechin — he received questions from the newspaper for this article and decided to express his concern about the professional level of the editors. He refused to answer questions - he advised renaming Vedomosti to Rumors or more carefully checking information from open sources. Vedomosti tried to follow his recommendations.

Proletarian

In 1977, Sechin entered the philological faculty of Leningrad State University. “The philology department was the most criminal in all of Leningrad, but Sechin entered there on his own, without any patronage or help,” recalls Sechin’s classmate, deputy head of the advertising department of Gazprom-Media LLC, Alexey Evseev. “They didn’t really like Sechin’s first two courses: the children of nomenklatura parents, the offspring of directors and other artists treated him with some contempt and snobbery, he didn’t really fit into this, as they say now, crowd.” “In his eyes, of course, we could look like wealthy mama's boys simply because we had a pair of jeans. Sechin accepted this social boundary with dignity,” says another classmate, vice-president of the League of Journalists of St. Petersburg, Viktor Mashendzhinov. “He communicated smoothly with everyone, without getting too close, but maintaining the appearance of a kind guy.”

Sechin studied in a Portuguese group of 10 students. He, Evseev recalls, with infinite patience found an approach to everyone, looked for comfortable situations that brought pleasure to the interlocutor, and little by little managed to build relationships with everyone: “I found the key to people and became my own, quite humorous person.”

To another classmate of Sechin, human rights activist Larisa Volodimerova, Sechin seemed to be a very lonely person by nature: “Despite the countless number of youthful friendships, as well as a colossal Don Juan list.” “Igor, of course, needed love, he was drawn to a friendly shoulder,” says Volodimerova.

Translator

Sechin went on his first trip to Mozambique in 1982, in his fifth year, together with Evseev, the latter recalls. Moreover, Evseev left after some time, and Sechin stayed for about another year and a half to earn money. This work had nothing to do with the KGB, Evseev assures: “It was a civilian trip, where Igor worked as a translator from Portuguese.” “It is impossible to make cooperation with the special service and business trips abroad directly dependent,” agrees the interlocutor at the Union of Veterans of Angola.

“Almost all the guys returned from Africa with malaria or severe stomach illnesses. But by those standards they earned very decent money,” recalls Volodimerova. One of her classmates, according to her, met Sechin at the Finland Station immediately after his return from Africa: “Igor was very happy - he wanted to show how cool and rich he was now. I caught a taxi, behaved noisily... Then everyone lived almost equally poorly. Igor was bursting with pride at how rich he was now. And he wasn’t greedy.”

But it wasn't just about the money. “As a student, Igor was terribly interested in Latin American revolutionary figures, and not only Che Guevara. And he really liked the military department. He still retained these hobbies,” says Evseev. He notes another feature of Sechin: Igor regularly read newspapers: “Although we were considered savvy, we were actually politically illiterate. No one really knew anything and could not answer basic questions about what was happening in the world. And Igor could answer any question - who is the enemy of the Korean people, etc.”

According to Nikolai Konyushkov, the only one of Sechin’s classmates interviewed who called him his friend, as students they both dreamed of becoming spies. When asked whether Sechin became a spy, Konyushkov laughed: “I don’t know, I hope he did!”

Returning from Mozambique, Sechin received a diploma in teaching French and Portuguese in 1984. “Igor was eager to take assignment from the military department, he wanted to get to the hot spot where the war was going on,” recalls Konyushkov. - So he wanted to assert himself. He had complexes related to the fact that he found himself among students from wealthy or creative families, and, unlike many of his classmates, he entered the university immediately after school, without serving in the army.”

And Sechin joined the army. He spent several months in Turkmenistan, they say in the Union of Veterans of Angola. There, in the military town of Yangaje, in the desert, there was an international center for training air defense specialists, where military personnel from African countries, including Angola and Mozambique, studied. “This is a terrible hole, the desert there is terrible. They made a training center there - they thought it would be easier for Africans to study. But they fainted there from the heat. On the other hand, there is a desert there, they conducted training exercises,” says an interlocutor from the Union of Veterans of Angola.

It was a kind of internship, he continues, after which Sechin went to Angola in January 1985. “In Angola he had the opportunity to work in many areas. In the Navy, he worked with an advisor to the Commander of the Navy. I worked in Luanda, where it was calmer, and on the southern front - in Cuito Cuanavale, in Minonga - these are troubled places where the main battles took place. Then he worked in a group of anti-aircraft missile forces in the Namib province,” says an interlocutor from the Union of Veterans of Angola.

It turns out that Sechin spent about four years in hot spots. He still loves to remember those years: when he relaxes, he only talks about how he worked in Africa, his friends tell him. The Union of Veterans of Angola is grateful to Sechin for his “comradely help”: he helped get an apartment for an office on Smolenskaya Square (the renovation was financed by VTB), and premises for a room of military glory in Tsaritsyn. Sechin helped another “Angolan”, the editor-in-chief of the Russian News Service, Sergei Dorenko, avoid prison (see inset).

Secretary

A vacancy in the department of twin cities, according to Mashendzhinov, was first offered to him, but he was not interested there. “And then I’m walking down the street and I see Igor. He's already glowing with happiness. I tell him: how are you? And he says that he got a job at the Leningrad City Executive Committee. Me: “What a fool, I didn’t go there.” And Sechin: “He’s a fool himself.” It’s like we haven’t seen each other since then,” says Mashendzhinov.

It was not possible to find out when and how Sechin met Putin. But having become chairman of the external relations committee of the St. Petersburg mayor's office in 1991, Putin took Sechin into his apparatus, which Sechin headed after some time. “Two loneliness have met,” political scientist Stanislav Belkovsky says ironically. - Putin was recalled from the GDR. And Sechin just recently returned from Angola. And the similarity of destinies in the ruins of the Soviet Union [connected them].”

“He was never visible in the apparatus, but he performed key functions for the committee - he coordinated the work of all departments, through him it was possible to get an appointment with Putin,” says Sechin’s former colleague at the mayor’s office. “Sechin’s desk was located between two offices - Putin’s and his deputy’s,” recalls film director Igor Shadkhan. - I came to interview Putin. And he was the only one in whose reception room I saw a tall man acting as a secretary. What struck me most was the black leather notebook, probably as thick as “War and Peace,” in which Sechin wrote down the contacts of all visitors. He also recorded my phone number.” Shadkhan characterizes Sechin as a “devoted, faithful adjutant”: “Sechin was not just an assistant. He knew a lot about Putin, I got the impression that they were clearly not connected by yesterday.<...>But, it seems to me, if tomorrow Putin says: “Igor, you need to leave,” Sechin will answer, “Yes!” and will go pack his things without question.”

“There was some kind of sporting event,” recalls a businessman familiar with Sechin. - We are standing, talking with Sechin, suddenly Putin, who was standing at a distance, remembers that he forgot the documents and says: “Igor Ivanovich, bring it!” Sechin, interrupting the conversation mid-sentence, pushing everyone around, ran to carry out the assignment. He was ready to serve Putin around the clock. Putin is working - Sechin is waiting for him. Putin in the gym - Sechin is waiting. Only once did Sechin allow himself to complain out loud that he works day and night and doesn’t even have time to play sports.”

“Money meant much less to Sechin than power,” continues the businessman. - His then wife Marina, an intelligent and active woman, was actively involved in business, in particular, she traded real estate. She said: “Let Igor sit on his salary of 200 rubles, and I will always earn my $5,000.” Marina could not even think then that he would make such a fantastic career.” “I understand that she is the breadwinner in the family, not he,” says Konyushkov. “She made good money, was involved in real estate, and allowed him to work in his element.”

Referent

Sechin followed Putin like a shadow, and replaced his notebook with a large leather briefcase, recalls a former Kremlin official. According to him, in the morning Sechin met Putin at the elevator (the guards informed him that the cartridge had arrived) and, while Putin went to his office, he reported to him about something along the way; and in the evening he accompanied me to the elevator.

Putin first instructed Sechin to deal with the schedules, the former official continues, but Sechin approached this issue very personally: he began to limit Putin’s communication with certain businessmen and officials, and, on the contrary, included someone in the schedule too often. Perhaps Sechin was trying to limit Putin’s communication with people associated with Boris Yeltsin’s family, Belkovsky argues: “For example, Valentina Yumasheva there is a turntable in the car, and somehow he gets into the car, removes the turntable, and there, at the other end of the line, Sechin stands and does everything so that he cannot connect with Putin.”

They explained to Sechin that the president cannot meet with a narrow group of people and constantly travel to the same places, the official continues, and in the end, six months later, Putin was convinced to transfer scheduling to another deputy - Dmitry Medvedev . When Sechin found out about this, he perceived it as a tragedy: the very fact that the patron transferred part of his powers to another caused him suffering, the official concludes. But in the end, Sechin had enough authority. According to the distribution of responsibilities in the administration, established in 2004, he headed the office and was responsible for issuing decrees, orders and other documents signed by the president. This document consolidated the actual state of affairs: “After Yukos affairs It became obvious to everyone that Sechin could stop any decree, initiate any draft decision,” says a former government official.

Surety

The plot of the YUKOS case is well known: the main owners of the company - Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, as well as managers who did not go abroad, were imprisoned, and the companies were presented with huge tax claims, went bankrupt and were sold off.

“Of course, Sechin was the leader and driving force behind the entire YUKOS business,” says former deputy chairman of the board of YUKOS, Alexander Temerko. - I personally spoke with Sechin several times. From conversations with Sechin, it followed that he did not recognize his own interest in the YUKOS case, that his task was only to look and figure it out, he did not make decisions, but only carried out instructions and passed information on to the top.”

According to Temerko, Sechin’s greatest fear was that the Yukos issue would get out of his control. “If the Kremlin decided to negotiate, Sechin would want to lead this process,” continues Temerko. “But they weren’t going to stop the attack on YUKOS, and Sechin had to lower our vigilance, understand how far and what we were ready to go.” The prospect of prosecution abroad did not frighten him. He said that you can shut the mouth of any foreign country; they are much more interested in Russia’s international position than in the YUKOS case.”

Key assets of Yukos after their sale went to Rosneft , these purchases made it Russia's largest oil company. And in mid-2004, Sechin became chairman of the board of directors of Rosneft (see the inset about his work at Rosneft). Khodorkovsky later said that Sechin initiated the first Yukos case out of greed, and the second out of cowardice.

Chancellor

Sechin devotes himself to this service without reserve. Here are a few characteristics given by his friends. “He is a workaholic and often stayed late in the Kremlin, often drawing up the president’s instructions himself after one meeting or another.” “This is a man with hellish efficiency who starves out. I don’t know how high the efficiency of his activities is, but if necessary, he will take the brain out of anyone. On business trips abroad, it is especially difficult to work with him: he can sleep three hours a day.” “For the last few years, Sechin has actually lived at work. He worked around the clock and could call home, for example, at three o’clock in the morning and ask his wife to send his son Vanya, with whom he wanted to communicate.” “He plays sports, weightlifts, he can make an appointment for six in the morning at the gym. Goes to bed at two, gets up at six. Modest in everyday life, not materialistic, not material, a patriot.”

Sechin extends his demands on himself to his colleagues and subordinates. “Sechin does not tolerate it when someone misses his meetings, which, like his patron’s, can start a couple of hours later,” says a top manager of a large state-owned company. - In China, one of Gazprom’s top managers missed a meeting with Sechin, going to a sporting event. Upon learning of this, Sechin became angry, and this almost cost Gazprom’s chair.”

Formally, Sechin had no relation to Gazprom, but he always tried to keep abreast of affairs in the company and communicate directly with its employees, several Gazprom managers said. Sechin suggested to some of them that they report to him directly about what was happening in the monopoly.

For Sechin, the work is more important than the people who do it. “Sechin never had a team,” says one of the former top managers of Rosneft. “He himself can be on someone’s team, but he cannot create.” Unlike his patron, Sechin does not take care of people, his acquaintance believes: the heroes of the YUKOS case are the president of Rosneft Sergei Bogdanchikov and the Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov lost their posts, investigator Salavat Karimov I didn’t receive any big posts; only Anton Ustinov (participated in the YUKOS case as the head of the legal department of the Ministry of Taxes and Duties) became deputy head of Sechin’s secretariat.

“They helped me, but they helped me in a strange way! - notes Dorenko. – As far as I know, the people of Yuri Mikhailovich [Luzhkov] wanted to see me in prison for at least one week. They didn’t put me in prison, but they gave me four years probation for the bruise! And it’s hard to understand: was this help or was it still an attempt to establish control over me?”

Foreteller Sechin

First. Sechin admitted that the conflict between BP and the Russian shareholders of TNK-BP came as a surprise to him. Russian shareholders opposed BP's alliance with Rosneft because they believed that it infringed on their interests and violated the shareholders' agreement, according to which BP should operate in Russia through TNK-BP. “I hope that all misunderstandings will be cleared and the issue will be resolved in a civilized manner: we will watch this<...>and we are confident that all problems will be resolved.”

In May, BP and Russian shareholders of TNK-BP announced that the deal would not go through.

In July, the Hungarian government bought MOL shares from Surgut for 1.88 billion euros.

Third. What has changed in the Russian Federation over the past 25 years? Sechin replied: “Everything has changed. We are a different country! This is the main answer to your question. If after the collapse of the USSR we used the infrastructure of the Soviet era, there was instability, but now there are no such problems. We have political stability, one of the highest in the world, I think.”

In December, elections to the State Duma were held in Russia, which caused such widespread dissatisfaction with fraud that the authorities were forced to launch political reform.

[Vedomosti, 03/19/2012, “Without Igor Sechin”: Igor Sechin will not work in the government of Dmitry Medvedev, four federal officials told Vedomosti. “Medvedev and Sechin will not work together, this is a medical fact. They can’t stand each other,” explains one. The Medvedev-Sechin combination is unviable, another believes: “Sechin is too influential, he will dominate Medvedev’s cabinet, this is unacceptable for the latter.” […]

Officials do not know exactly where Sechin is going. Some say that it will go back to the presidential administration, others - that it will go to some large state-owned company, for example Gazprom, and still others - that it will be given to the law enforcement agencies. Sechin is unlikely to be satisfied with the post of deputy head of the presidential administration, says his acquaintance, and the head’s place is firmly occupied by another Putin ally, Sergei Ivanov, and Putin recently confirmed that Ivanov will remain in his post.

Sechin’s apparatus is now more active than ever, as noted in the government apparatus. It was Sechin who started the so-called anti-corruption campaign to identify conflicts of interest among the management of state-owned companies - and led it. “Maybe he will head some new anti-corruption structure or the FSB, specially created for him,” jokes a government official.

Sechin specifically took on this complex project (searching for persons affiliated with the management of state-owned companies) in order to increase his political reputation, says a person close to the presidential administration. And Sechin’s replacement in the government cannot be mechanical, it must become a landmark, bring a new spirit to the government, he believes.
Among Sechin's likely successors, Vedomosti's interlocutors most often name Sergei Kiriyenko: in this way the Kremlin will demonstrate a change in ideology - state capitalism to liberalism. - Insert K.ru]