Assault on Budapest October 29, 1944 - February 13, 1945

FIRST STORM OF SEVASTOPOL (OCTOBER 30 - NOVEMBER 31, 1941) First assault of Sevastopol (October 30 - November 21, 1941) The initial plan of the German command was to capture Sevastopol at lightning speed before the Primorsky Army approached the Sevastopol defensive

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As a result of the Debrecen offensive operation (the first operation of the Red Army on the territory of Hungary), the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky reached the line Chop, Szolnok, Baya. They were opposed by the German Army Group South (8th and 6th Field, 2nd German Tank and 3rd Hungarian Armies), commanded by General G. Friesner. The 3rd Ukrainian Front of Marshal of the Soviet Union F.I. was also involved in the Budapest operation. Tolbukhin, who completed the Belgrade operation.
The German-Hungarian command on the approaches to Budapest created a defense in depth, consisting of three defensive lines, which rested their flanks on the Danube River north and south of the city. The Budapest defense area was an integral part of the Margarita defensive line. The city itself was turned into a fortress.
By the beginning of the operation, the southeastern approaches to Budapest were defended by troops of the 3rd Hungarian Army, reinforced by German tank and motorized divisions. Here, on a 250-kilometer front, 11 enemy divisions operated against 36 Soviet ones.
The Supreme High Command Headquarters' plan for the operation was to deliver the main attack on Budapest from the southeast and east. This decision was predetermined by the fact that this direction was the most convenient for the advance of Soviet troops and was covered by relatively weak enemy forces.
The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 46th Army, 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps southeast of Budapest and capture it.
The 7th Guards Army was supposed to deliver an auxiliary strike. The remaining forces of the front received the task of pinning down the opposing enemy troops and preventing their transfer to the Budapest area.
The offensive began on October 29. On the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, the 46th Army broke through the defenses on the first day and, introducing mechanized corps, began a rapid advance.
On November 2, the mechanized corps were already 15 km southeast of Budapest, but were unable to enter the city on the move. The German command quickly transferred three tank and one motorized divisions to Budapest, which were able to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. In the center and on the right wing of the front, Soviet troops encountered serious enemy resistance when crossing the Tisza River.
On November 3, fierce fighting broke out on the immediate approaches to Budapest. The Supreme High Command headquarters was forced to point out to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front that further attempts to attack Budapest in a narrow area with limited forces could lead to unjustified losses and expose the troops operating in this direction to a flank attack from the enemy from the northeast. In order to strengthen the troops of the center of the front, the regrouping of the 6th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General A.G. began here. Kravchenko and the cavalry mechanized group of Lieutenant General I.A. Plieva.
Front troops resumed their offensive on November 11. It lasted 16 days. However, it was not possible to cut up and defeat the Budapest group east of the city. The second attempt to capture Budapest was also unsuccessful. The enemy managed to create a dense defense on the immediate approaches to Budapest, transferring 12 divisions from the 4th Ukrainian Front to the Budapest direction, the offensive of which developed extremely slowly in late October - the first half of November.
On December 5, 1944, the 2nd Ukrainian Front resumed its offensive. For eight days, the troops of the center and left wing tried to encircle the enemy by encircling from the north and southwest. At the same time, the mobile formations of the front reached the Ipel River, bordering Czechoslovakia, together with the 7th Guards Army of Colonel General M.S. Shumilov reached the left bank of the Danube north of Budapest and overcame the first and second lines of the outer defense of Budapest.
At the same time, the 46th Army crossed the Danube south of the city and captured a bridgehead. But due to lack of forces and fierce enemy resistance, she was unable to reach the Hungarian capital from the southwest. Thus, the third attempt to capture Budapest was unsuccessful.
The German command took all measures to prevent the capture of Budapest by Soviet troops and the withdrawal of its last ally from the war. Due to the high command reserve and regrouping, it increased the composition of Army Group South from 38 to 51 divisions and brigades.
On December 20, Soviet troops resumed their offensive. It developed successfully. By the end of December 26, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts united northwest of Budapest, completing the encirclement of the 188,000-strong enemy group (about 10 divisions). Having created an external front of encirclement and thrown the enemy west of Budapest, Soviet troops tightened the ring around the city. The enemy, blocked in the forests northwest of Budapest, was destroyed by the end of December.
On December 29, the command of both fronts, in order to avoid further bloodshed and destruction of Budapest, presented an ultimatum to the encircled troops to surrender. However, the enemy command not only rejected him, but also ordered the murder of the envoys captains M. Steinmetz and I. Ostapenko, violating international law on the inviolability of envoys.
Soviet troops began to eliminate the encircled enemy. During January 1945, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts had to fight heavy battles to repel counterattacks of German troops, whose goal was to release their Budapest group and restore the front line along the Danube. The German command, having concentrated almost half of all tank and motorized divisions available on the Soviet-German front near Budapest, launched three strong counterattacks on the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from January 2 to 26, but during heavy fighting they were repulsed.
Directly in the city, the battles were fought by a specially created Budapest group of troops, which included four rifle corps and, until January 18, a Romanian army corps.
The battles for the liberation of the eastern part of the city (Pest) took place from December 27 to January 18, and the western part (Buda) - from January 20 to February 13.
Many Hungarian soldiers and officers took part in the battles for the liberation of Buda, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Soviet troops. According to the memoirs of General S.M. Shtemenko, these Hungarian volunteer soldiers “knew their words and their deeds.” It was from their number, according to incomplete data, that about 600 people died a heroic death.
The position of the surrounded enemy became worse and worse. If at first 40-45 planes delivered the necessary cargo every day, then from January 20 the supply was disrupted by Soviet aviation. On February 13, the enemy group in Budapest, having lost up to 50 thousand killed and 138 thousand captured, ceased to exist.
This concluded the Budapest offensive operation. During its course, Soviet troops advanced from 120 to 240 km, liberated about 45 percent of the territory of Hungary (and taking into account the Debrecen operation - 74 percent) and created conditions for a further offensive in Czechoslovakia and in the Vienna direction.
The German command was forced to transfer a large number of formations, especially tank and motorized ones, to the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, which were urgently needed to repel the Red Army's offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction in January-February 1945.
These results were achieved at great cost. The losses of Soviet troops amounted to 320 thousand people, of which 80 thousand were irrevocable.
The offensive actions of Soviet troops in the autumn and winter of 1944–1945 in the southwestern direction led to a radical change in the entire political situation in the Balkans. To Romania and Bulgaria, which were previously withdrawn from the war, another state was added - Hungary.
The Soviet government highly appreciated the actions of the troops in the Budapest operation. On June 9, 1945, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal “For the Capture of Budapest,” which was awarded to 350 thousand people.
79 formations and units received the honorary name - Budapest.

By the end of September 1944, the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Rodion Malinovsky was opposed by Army Group South (it was created instead of the former Army Group South Ukraine) and part of Army Group F. A total of 32 divisions (including 4 tank, 2 motorized and 3 cavalry) and 5 brigades (3 infantry and 2 tank). German troops had about 3.5 thousand guns and mortars, about 300 tanks, assault guns and 550 aircraft.

The 2nd Ukrainian Front included the 40th, 7th Guards, 27th, 53rd and 46th Armies, the 6th Guards Tank and 5th Air Armies, 2 cavalry mechanized groups and 18 1st Tank Corps. Two Romanian combined arms armies (1st and 4th), the Tudor Vladimirescu volunteer division and the Romanian aviation corps were also subordinate to the Soviet front. This grouping included: 40 rifle divisions, 17 Romanian infantry divisions, 2 fortified areas, 3 tank, 2 mechanized and 3 cavalry corps, 10.2 thousand guns and mortars, 750 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.1 thousand aircraft.

According to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the main goal of the Soviet troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front (2nd and 4th Ukrainian fronts) was the liberation of Hungary and Transylvania and the withdrawal of Hungary from the war. This created the preconditions for the Red Army to reach the borders of Austria, the southern regions of Czechoslovakia, and a threat to Southern Germany appeared. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were supposed to defeat the enemy group in Debrecen (6th German and 3rd Hungarian armies) and liberate Northern Transylvania (defeating the 8th German and 2nd Hungarian armies). In addition, Malinovsky’s armies were supposed to go to the rear of the Carpathian group (1st German tank and 1st Hungarian armies), providing assistance to the 4th Ukrainian Front and the 38th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Carpathians.

The front command decided to deliver the main blow in the center in the Debrecen direction, along the line of Oradea, Debrecen, Nyiregyhaza. The front's strike force included: the 53rd Army under the command of Ivan Managarov, the 6th Guards Tank Army of Andrei Kravchenko and the Cavalry Mechanized Group (KMG) of Issa Pliev (2 cavalry and 1 mechanized corps). On the left wing of the front, the 46th Army under the command of Ivan Shlemin and the 1st Romanian Army under Corps General V. Atanasiu were advancing. The left wing of the front advanced across the territory of Yugoslavia in the Szeged direction, and was supposed to take a bridgehead on the right bank of the Tissa River. On the right wing were advancing the 40th under the command of Philip Zhmachenko (in the Sighet direction) and the 7th Guards Army of Mikhail Shumilov (in the direction of Dej and Satu Mare) and the 27th Army of Sergei Trofimenko (in the Cluj direction). The Romanian 4th Army of Corps General G. Avramescu and the cavalry-mechanized group of Lieutenant General S.I. Gorshkov (1 tank and 1 cavalry corps) were also located here. Later, part of the forces of the right wing was transferred to the central sector.

Crossing the Tisza

On the eve of the operation, in the second half of September 1944, Soviet long-range aviation carried out strong attacks on important railway junctions, bridges, warehouses and other objects on Hungarian territory. Aircraft also attacked Budapest, Satu Mare, Debrecen and other Hungarian centers. The offensive began on October 6 with a short but strong artillery and air bombardment. Soviet artillery and aviation attacked enemy positions, fortifications, firing points and rear areas.

In the Debrecen direction, Soviet troops almost immediately achieved significant success. On the very first day of the offensive, the 6th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 27th Army advanced to a depth of 20 km. At the same time, Soviet troops had to repel fierce enemy counterattacks in the area between Oradea and Salonta. However, with the transition of the troops of Managarov and Pliev to Elek and Kartsag and on the left wing of the front of the 46th Army of Shlemin to Subotica and Szeged, the resistance of the Hungarian army was broken. The 53rd Army of Managarov and KMG Pliev, with the support of the 5th Air Army of General S.K. Goryunov, defeated the 3rd Hungarian Army. Soviet troops not only broke through the enemy’s defenses, but also advanced up to 100 kilometers in three days, reaching the Kartsag region. On October 8, Pliev’s cavalry-mechanized group reached the southwestern approaches to Debrecen. On the same day, Soviet troops crossed the Tissa and captured a number of bridgeheads.

Thus, as a result of the breakthrough of the front and the rapid advance of Soviet troops, the Debrecen enemy group was captured from the west, which created the threat of encirclement and complete destruction of the German-Hungarian armies in Transylvania and worsened their position on the Carpathian border. The German command gave the order to withdraw troops. Pursued by formations of the 40th, 27th and 4th Romanian armies, the German-Hungarian troops retreated in the direction of Nyiregyhaza.

The German command, in order to ensure the withdrawal of the armies and close the gap in the defense, threw significant additional and reserve forces and means into the battle. Particular attention was paid to the Oradea - Debrecen line. Already on October 8, the German 3rd Panzer Division launched a counterattack in the Kartsag area. On October 18, the 24th Panzer Division and the 4th SS Motorized Division were thrown into battle. In total, the German command concentrated 13 divisions, including 5 tank and motorized divisions. In turn, the front command strengthened the main strike group with the help of formations transferred from the right flank, from the Regin-Turda area - the 7th Guards Army and Gorshkov's cavalry-mechanized group.

During a fierce battle, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, Soviet troops took Oradea on October 12, and Debrecen on October 20. Developing an offensive to the north, Pliev’s cavalry broke into the city of Nyiregyhaza on October 21. The advanced Soviet units reached the Tissu River, cutting off the escape routes of the German-Hungarian troops. As a result, the German command, in order to eliminate the threat of encirclement, had to organize a strong counter-offensive with the forces of three army and one tank corps. German troops were able to intercept KMG Pliev’s communications. On October 27, Pliev’s troops left Nyiregyhaza and retreated to the main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

By this time, the divisions of the 53rd and 7th Guards armies had reached Tissa in the Szolnok-Polgar sector. On the left flank, units of Shlemin's 46th Army occupied a large bridgehead on the Tisza and reached the Danube in the area of ​​the city of Baia and further south. On the right flank of the front, the 40th, 4th Romanian and 27th armies advanced 110-120 km by the evening of October 20 and crossed the Hungarian border a few days later. Thus, the armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the left flank crossed the Tissa and occupied a large bridgehead, in the center on a wide front they reached the river, and on the right flank they came close to the river.

The operation was successful, although it did not solve the main problem. It was not possible to bring Hungary out of the war. The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front defeated the enemy group in Debrecen, advanced 130-275 km in various sectors and occupied a large bridgehead on the Tisza River, creating conditions for a decisive offensive in the Budapest direction. During the offensive battles, Northern Transylvania and the eastern regions of Hungary were liberated. The German-Hungarian troops suffered a heavy defeat, losing more than 40 thousand people as prisoners alone. In addition, the plans of the German command to create a stable line of defense along the Transylvanian Alps were thwarted. German-Hungarian troops retreated to the Hungarian Plain.

The important significance of the operation of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was that the exit of the main forces of the Malinovsky Front to the rear of the Carpathian enemy group created a serious threat for the German-Hungarian troops on the Carpathian border and played a decisive role in the liberation of Transcarpathian Rus'. In mid-October 1944, the German command began to withdraw troops in front of the center and left wing of the 4th Ukrainian Front. This allowed the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, previously stuck on the enemy’s powerful Carpathian line, to pursue the enemy and successfully complete the Carpathian-Uzhgorod operation, liberating Mukachevo and Uzhgorod. Transcarpathian Rus' (Ukraine) became part of Soviet Ukraine, this completed the process of reunification of Russian lands.

In addition, under the influence of the Debrecen operation, the political situation in Hungary changed. In the Hungarian army, desertion and defection to the side of the Soviet troops increased. And the Horthy regime intensified negotiations with England and the USA and agreed to conclude a truce with the USSR. True, this political process did not end in success. Horthy was removed and replaced by the right-wing radical Szalasi, who continued the war to the end. Additional German forces were brought into Hungary.

The attack on Budapest began almost without pause. Already on October 29, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front struck the enemy. The operation involved troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and formations of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Fyodor Tolbukhin. Tolbukhin's troops had just completed the Belgrade operation () and were regrouping in Hungary to participate in the attack on Budapest.

The headquarters set the task of striking with the aim of encircling and defeating the enemy group in Budapest, liberating the Hungarian capital, in order to bring Hungary out of the war, and create the preconditions for the liberation of Czechoslovakia and Austria. The main blow was delivered on the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front by Shlemin's 46th Army, reinforced by the 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps. Shlemin's army advanced southeast of Budapest, bypassing the city and was supposed to take the Hungarian capital. The second blow from the area northeast of the city of Szolnok was delivered by Shumilov’s 7th Guards Army and Kravchenko’s 6th Guards Tank Army. She was supposed to bypass Budapest from the northeast. The remaining forces of the front were given the task of pinning down enemy troops in the center and on the far right flank, advancing in the direction of Miskolc. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, after completing the concentration of forces in the Banat region, were supposed to occupy bridgeheads on the right bank of the Danube in Hungary and develop an offensive to the west and north.

Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group South and the Hungarian armies. The German-Hungarian armies relied on the powerful Budapest fortified area and three lines of defense. Adolf Hitler attached great importance to Hungary. Here were the last sources of oil. He even stated that he would rather give up Berlin than Hungarian oil and Austria. Therefore, powerful mobile formations were concentrated in Hungary, including selected SS troops. In Hungary, the Germans and Hungarians were going to stop the Soviet armies and prevent them from passing further.

The left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Budapest direction, where Hungarian troops were mainly defending, and on November 2 reached the immediate approaches to Budapest from the south. However, they failed to take the city. The German command transferred 14 divisions (including 3 tank and one motorized division) to the area of ​​the Hungarian capital and, relying on strong fortifications previously equipped, stopped the Soviet offensive. The Soviet command suspended the offensive in the Budapest direction and continued it on other sectors of the front. During stubborn battles on November 11-26, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses between Tisza and the Danube and advanced 100 kilometers in the northwestern direction. Soviet troops reached the outer defensive perimeter of the Hungarian capital.

On December 5, the troops of the center and left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front resumed their attack on Budapest. Units of the 7th Guards, 6th Guards Tank Army and Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group reached the Danube north of Budapest by December 9. As a result, the Budapest enemy group had its escape route to the north cut off. On the left flank, Shlemin's 46th Army crossed the Danube south of Budapest. However, Soviet troops were unable to take Budapest this time either. The Germans and Hungarians stopped Soviet troops at the Margarita Line. The German command, having 250 thousand in the Budapest area. the group, which relied on a strong fortification system, held back the Soviet offensive. German and Hungarian troops offered fierce resistance, and the fighting became extremely stubborn. The Soviet command did not have correct information about the enemy’s forces (this was due to intelligence shortcomings) and was unable to correctly assess the enemy’s ability to resist. On the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Soviet troops occupied Miskolc and reached the border of Czechoslovakia.

At this time, the 3rd Ukrainian Front (three Soviet and one Bulgarian combined arms and one air army) joined the battles for Hungary. After the liberation of Belgrade, Soviet troops, with the support of the Danube Flotilla, crossed the Danube and advanced to lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. Here they linked up with the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

On December 10-20, 1944, troops on two fronts prepared for a new offensive. The Soviet armies were supposed to complete the encirclement and destruction of the Budapest group with attacks from the northeast, east and southwest and liberate the capital of Hungary. Troops on two fronts, overcoming fierce enemy resistance (German-Hungarian forces consisted of 51 German and Hungarian divisions and 2 brigades, including 13 tank and motorized ones), advanced in converging directions and after 6 days of fierce fighting united in the area of ​​​​the city of Esztergom. German troops counterattacked but were defeated. As a result, 188 thousand people were surrounded 50-60 km west of Budapest. enemy group.

To stop further bloodshed, the Soviet command sent envoys with a proposal to surrender. Captain Ilya Ostapenko's group was sent to Buda, and captain Miklos Steinmetz to Pest. The Germans killed Soviet envoys. Thus, Budapest, with its more than a million population, due to the fault of the German command and the government of Szálasi, who himself fled the city, was doomed to become the scene of a brutal battle in which thousands of civilians died. The German command did not intend to give up Hungary and continued to strengthen the Army “South” group. To hold Hungary, 37 divisions were transferred, which were withdrawn from the central sector (Berlin direction) of the Eastern Front and other directions. By the beginning of 1945, 16 tank and motorized divisions were concentrated south of the Carpathians. This was half of all the armored forces of the German army on the Eastern Front. The Germans had never had such a density of tank troops in one direction on the Eastern Front.

Fierce fighting continued in Hungary. The German command tried to release the encircled Budapest group with strong counterattacks. German-Hungarian troops launched three strong counterattacks. In some cases, there were 50-60 German tanks per 1 km of the breakthrough area. On January 2-6, 1945, German troops advanced along the right bank of the Danube by 30-40 km. The offensive of January 18-26 (the third counterattack) launched from the area north of Lake Balaton was especially powerful. The Germans were able to temporarily dismember the 3rd Ukrainian Front and reach the western bank of the Danube.

To stop the enemy advance, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, applied the experience of the Battle of Kursk. Soviet troops quickly created a defense in depth up to 25-50 km deep. A major role was played by reconnaissance, which promptly revealed the movement of enemy forces, as well as artillery and aviation, which carried out preemptive strikes in threatened directions. Through the joint efforts of the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, the enemy breakthrough was eliminated. By early February the front had been stabilized and the Germans had exhausted their offensive capabilities.

At a time when German troops were trying to release the Budapest group, part of the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front - a specially created Budapest group of troops under the command of Lieutenant General Ivan Afonin, and the field of his wound, Ivan Managarov (3 rifle corps, 9 artillery brigades), stormed Budapest. The fighting was stubborn. Only on January 18 did they take the eastern part of the city - Pest, and on February 13 - Buda. About 140 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured.

Results of the operation

Soviet troops surrounded and destroyed an enemy force of almost 190,000, liberated two-thirds of the country and took Budapest by storm. During the long battle (108 days), 40 divisions and 3 brigades were defeated, 8 divisions and 5 brigades were completely destroyed.

The successful completion of the Budapest operation radically changed the entire strategic situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The southern flank of the German armed forces was deeply covered. The German command was forced to speed up the withdrawal of troops from Yugoslavia. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts created the conditions for the liberation of Czechoslovakia and the attack on Vienna.

On December 22, the Hungarian Provisional Government was formed. On December 28, the Provisional Government announced the country's withdrawal from the war on the side of Germany. Hungary declared war on Germany. On January 20, 1945, the Hungarian delegation in Moscow signed an armistice agreement. The liberation of Hungary by Soviet troops thwarted the plans of London and Washington to use Hungarian territory in their own interests.

Budapest operation- offensive operation of the southern wing of the Soviet troops during the Second World War in 1944-1945. It was carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts from October 29, 1944 to February 13, 1945 with the goal of defeating German troops in Hungary and withdrawing this country from the war. In addition, the offensive involved blocking enemy troops in the Balkans.

The situation on the eve of the battle

By the time the Soviet offensive began in Transdanubian Hungary, Germany was forced to fight on three fronts: in Italy, France and against the Soviet Union - in Central and Southern Europe, having lost its most important allies: Romania, Bulgaria and Finland. Soviet troops conducted offensive operations in Yugoslavia and East Prussia. The Germans suffered heavy losses, losing a significant part of their industry and losing the ability to wage a full-fledged war in the air.

Hitler was determined to hold on to the Hungarian capital. He attached particular importance to the oil region of Nagykanizsa, declaring that it was sooner possible to agree to the surrender of Berlin than to the loss of Hungarian oil and Austria.

2nd Ukrainian Front (consisting of 5 Soviet and 2 Romanian combined arms, 1 tank and 1 air armies - a total of 40 rifle, 3 tank, 2 mechanized divisions, 3 cavalry corps and 1 tank brigade) under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky to the beginning The operation was located at the turn of Chop-Polgar - the eastern bank of the river. Tisa to Tisaug and further to Bahia. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union Fyodor Tolbukhin, having completed the Belgrade operation, were just beginning to be transferred to Hungary at the beginning of the operation (the 46th Army, reinforced by two mechanized corps). The task was to launch a massive frontal attack on the Budapest area, remove Hungary from the war, and create the preconditions for an offensive in Austria and the Czech Republic.

The Soviet troops were opposed by the German Army Group South (Colonel General Hans Friessner) consisting of 35 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized divisions, and 3 brigades), as well as the remnants of the Hungarian army. The German command had at its disposal a total of 190 thousand soldiers and officers, a heavily fortified large city and three lines of defense, which rested their flanks on the Danube north and south of the city (an integral part of the Margarita defensive line, running from the Drava River to the coast lakes Balaton and Velence and the bends of the Danube near the city of Vac and further along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border).

Progress of the operation

The offensive on Budapest began with the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on October 29, two days after the end of the Debrecen operation. The Soviet command decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 46th Army, 2nd and 4th Guards Motorized Corps southeast of Budapest and capture it. The 7th Guards Army was supposed to launch an auxiliary attack from the area northeast of the city of Szolnok and seize a bridgehead on the western bank of the Tisza River. The remaining forces of the front received the task of advancing in the direction of Miskolc in order to pin down the opposing enemy troops and prevent their transfer to the Budapest area. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was supposed to complete the concentration of the main forces in the Banat region and at the same time, with its advanced units, seize bridgeheads on the right bank of the Danube in Hungary.

The troops of the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front broke through the enemy’s defenses and, after introducing the 2nd and 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Corps into the battle, began a rapid advance. On November 2, the corps reached the near approaches to Budapest from the south, but were unable to break into the city on the move. The Germans transferred three tank and one mechanized divisions here from the Miskolc area, which put up stubborn resistance. On November 4, the Soviet headquarters ordered the command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to expand the offensive zone in order to defeat the enemy group in Budapest with attacks from the north, east and south. On November 11-26, the front troops broke through the enemy defenses between the Tisza and the Danube and, having advanced in a northwestern direction up to 100 km, approached the outer defensive perimeter of Budapest, but this time they were unable to capture the city. Faced with stubborn enemy resistance, Soviet troops suspended their attacks.

At the beginning of December, an attack on Budapest was again launched by the forces of the center and southern wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. As a result, Soviet troops reached the Danube north and north-west of Budapest, cutting off the Budapest enemy group’s retreat to the north on December 5. The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (three Soviet and one Bulgarian combined arms and one air army - a total of 31 rifle divisions, 1 fortified area, a marine brigade, 1 cavalry, 1 tank and 2 mechanized corps) by this time crossed the Danube with the active assistance of ships The Danube military flotilla reached northeast of Lake Balaton and created conditions for joint actions with the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

Having transferred reinforcements, the enemy launched strong counterattacks on December 7, which the troops of the 46th Army successfully repelled. The 57th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, having crossed the Danube on November 7-9, during the Apatin-Kaposvar operation, reached the area south of Lake Balaton by December 9. From the second half of November on the right bank of the Danube, the 4th Guards Army, which arrived as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, began fighting on the right bank of the Danube, whose troops united with the 46th Army in the area of ​​Lake Velence. Thus, the Budapest enemy group was engulfed by Soviet troops from the north and southwest.

On December 10-20, troops on both fronts prepared for a new offensive. They were supposed to complete the encirclement with joint attacks from the northeast, east and southwest, defeat the Budapest group and finally capture Budapest. By the beginning of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front included 39 rifle divisions, 2 fortified areas, 2 cavalry, 2 tank, 2 mechanized corps and 13 Romanian divisions. The German Army Group South and part of the forces of Group F opposing the Soviet troops consisted of 51 German and Hungarian divisions and 2 brigades (including 13 tank and motorized divisions and 1 brigade).

On December 12, a directive was received to begin the offensive on the 20th. Having launched an offensive, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses north and southwest of Budapest and, building on their success, completed the encirclement of the Budapest group on December 26.

On December 29, the Soviet command sent an ultimatum to the surrounded garrison to surrender. The letter with the ultimatum was to be delivered by the parliamentarians: captain Ilya Ostapenko - to Buda, captain Miklos Steinmetz - to Pest. As Steinmetz's car, flying a white flag, approached the enemy positions, German troops opened fire with machine guns. Steinmetz and junior sergeant Filimonenko died on the spot. Ostapenko's group was fired upon by mortars while crossing the front line back, Ostapenko died on the spot, two other members of the group survived.

After this, fierce battles began to liquidate the garrison, which continued throughout January and the first half of February 1945.

During the operation in January-February 1945, troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, reinforced by units and formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, repelled 3 strong counterattacks of German troops trying to relieve the group encircled in Budapest. When organizing counterattacks, German troops in some areas created a density of up to 50-60 tanks per kilometer of front. In this situation, the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Marshal Tolbukhin, used the experience of the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk - in a short time his troops created a defense in depth up to 25-50 km, which made it possible to stop the counter-offensive. A major role was played by the organization of effective reconnaissance, timely detection of the advance and deployment of enemy groups, which made it possible to launch preemptive artillery and air strikes and to concentrate the main efforts in threatening directions in advance. Skillfully and timely maneuvering troops and anti-tank weapons, Soviet troops created a density of up to 160-170 guns per kilometer of front in the most important areas.

In the first half of January 1945, the main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front launched an attack on Komarno, which made it possible to somewhat reduce the counter-offensive impulse of the German troops.

From December 27, 1944 to February 13, 1945, urban battles for Budapest continued, which were waged by a specially created Budapest group of troops (3 rifle corps, 9 artillery brigades from the 2nd Ukrainian Front (commander - Lieutenant General Ivan Afonin, then, in connection with with the wound of Afonin, - Lieutenant General Ivan Managarov)). The German forces, numbering a total of 188 thousand people, were commanded by SS Oberstgruppenführer Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch. The battles were particularly stubborn. By January 18, Soviet troops captured the eastern part of the city - Pest.

Only on February 13 did the battle end with the liquidation of the enemy group and the liberation of Budapest. The defense commander and his staff were captured. In honor of the victory in Moscow, a salute was given with twenty-four artillery salvoes from 324 guns.

Results of the battle

Troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts liberated the central regions of Hungary and its capital, Budapest, surrounded and destroyed the 188,000-strong enemy force, and Hungary was withdrawn from the war.

The successful completion of the Budapest operation dramatically changed the entire strategic situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front and made it possible to develop deep coverage of the entire southern flank of German troops. A threat was created to the communications of the Balkan enemy group, which was forced to accelerate the withdrawal of its troops from Yugoslavia. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts were given the opportunity to develop operations in Czechoslovakia and in the Vienna direction.

Budapest operation in culture

The final lines of M. Blanter’s song based on the verses of M. Isakovsky “Enemies burned their home”:

The march of the famous Soviet military conductor and composer Semyon Aleksandrovich Chernetsky was dedicated to the capture of Budapest by Soviet troops. The march was written in 1945 and was called “The Entry of the Red Army into Budapest.”

• Ayanyan, Eduard Melikovich, the battery led by him destroyed 36 machine gun and 20 sniper points, 40 houses with firing points, 12 vehicles with troops and cargo, two armored personnel carriers with a crew, suppressed the fire of four artillery batteries, captured 41 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 88 mm anti-aircraft gun. Despising death, under incessant machine-gun and artillery-mortar fire, Senior Lieutenant Ayanyan went to the guns and personally supervised their movement to new places. In the most dangerous moments, he himself looked for enemy firing points and often personally aimed the guns at the target, destroying it with direct fire from a distance of 300-400 meters.
• Koryagin, Pyotr Kornilovich, foreman of the pontoon company of the 44th motorized pontoon-bridge battalion (2nd pontoon-bridge brigade, 46th Army, 2nd Ukrainian Front) senior sergeant Pyotr Koryagin December 4, 1944 during the crossing of the Danube River 108- 1st Infantry Division in the area of ​​​​the settlement of Szigetuifalu, located 20 kilometers south of Budapest, commanding the crew of the pontoon, landed an infantry landing force on the pier of the city of Erd and, taking advantage of the enemy’s confusion, led the soldiers into an attack. As a result of the brave and decisive actions of the brave warrior-pontooner, the Nazis were knocked out of the trenches of the first position, and the Soviet infantrymen under the command of Senior Sergeant P.K. Koryagin captured a bridgehead on the right bank of the Danube.